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BOOK REVIEWS
The Divine Order, the Human Order, and the Order of Nature: Historical Per-
spectives, edited by Eric Watkins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
288 pages. $74.00 (hardcover).
JULIE WALSH, Université du Québec à Montréal
In his introduction to this rich collection of essays, Eric Watkins notes that 
a growing dissatisfaction with the limits of the traditional rationalist/em-
piricist distinction has, in recent years, led a number of scholars to focus on 
other possible narrative structures for studying the evolution of thought 
throughout the modern period. Watkins suggests that the narrative of 
order is particularly promising because a philosopher’s understanding of 
natural and moral laws, their justification, and their consequences, can 
unite the most central considerations of any philosophical system of the 
period: metaphysics, epistemology, science, and morality. In this way, the 
focus on order avoids the pitfalls of other narratives that focus on theoreti-
cal issues to the exclusion of practical ones or vice versa. Thus the aim of 
the volume is to “suggest an outline for an original account of the history 
of modern western European thought, one that is based on the centrality 
of, and relations among, different notions of order (the natural, moral, 
divine, and human)” (xxvi).
The volume begins with two essays on the medieval period from 
Marilyn McCord Adams and Steven Nadler. Adams provides a detailed 
discussion of Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham on the connection between 
the natural and divine order. While causal powers explain natural phe-
nomena for these medievals, Adams notes that these thinkers all thought 
that the natural order is ultimately subordinated to the divine order. This 
is because God determines which powers exist, the extent to which they 
are expressed, and the content of the laws decreed to voluntary agents 
according to His ends. Of particular interest is Adams’s discussion of the 
fact that these authors accept the possibility that God may change the 
content of the laws according to the state of human beings (viz. pre- or 
post-lapsarian), thus highlighting the role of God’s ends in the decree of 
positive and moral law.




In his chapter, Nadler defends an interpretation of Maimonides accord-
ing to which the righteous person is literally protected from all manner of 
evil. Maimonides claims that through intellectual perfection, characterized 
as a turning towards God, human beings merit a kind of providence that 
is described as an “overflow” of knowledge from God. This knowledge, 
Nadler argues, contains the knowledge of natural laws, which provides 
insight into causal connections. This knowledge thus endows the righteous 
with the power to predict natural phenomena. So, knowing the divine 
order gives knowledge of natural laws, which in turn reduces or eliminates 
the chance of harm.
The early modern section contains six essays. In the first, Daniel Garber 
compares two systems that ground the order of nature in God—Descartes 
and Leibniz—with two that do not—Hobbes and Spinoza. After canvassing 
the arguments for grounding the order of nature in divine will (Descartes) 
and in divine reason (Leibniz) Garber uses the “order of geometry” to 
explain the ground of the order of nature for Hobbes and Spinoza. Im-
portantly, Hobbes and Spinoza do not appeal to God to explain the nature 
of motion. Garber notes that, instead, Hobbes takes motion to be part of 
the domain of geometry and Spinoza seems to suggest that the laws of 
matter and motion have the same status as laws of geometry. Garber thus 
concludes that Hobbes and Spinoza agree that the order of nature is noth-
ing more than a fact about the world that is no way subordinated to a 
higher order.
By contrast, everything about the natural order is subordinated to the 
divine order in Malebranche’s world, which is taken up by Robert Mer-
rihew Adams in the next chapter. There, Adams takes on the difficult task 
of carefully delineating the many causal concepts at play in Malebranche’s 
occasionalist universe. Of particular note is Adams’s illuminating discus-
sion of the difficult distinction between divine practical volitions and mere 
willings. The treatment of the various causal notions in Malebranche’s 
system is oriented towards an ultimate discussion of what falls outside 
the scope of these causal concepts, namely, the nature of created free-
dom. Adams suggests that while all “things” fall under the authority of 
the divine substance, free acts or “non-things” fall under the authority of 
created-mind substances. While Adams is surely right about this, the most 
vexed question in Malebranche scholarship remains: what is entailed by 
a conception of freedom that has “no-thing” as its expression? While this 
question is not answered by Adams, his work to decorticate the concepts 
involved in the discussion is essential for future studies.
The discussion of Malebranche continues in Tad Schmaltz’s chapter de-
voted to a comparison of the centrality of general laws in Malebranche, 
Berkeley, and Hume. He demonstrates that while all three see general 
laws as central to the natural and moral orders, for Hume they derive 
from primitive features of human nature (“custom” and “moral senti-
ments”) while Malebranche and Berkeley ground them in divine action. 
But while Berkeley’s God determines the content of these laws in terms of 
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His concern for the welfare of His creation, Malebranche’s God only ever 
acts for His own glory. Thus, for Hume, the human order determines the 
natural and moral orders while for Malebranche and Berkeley they are 
determined by the divine order.
We then return to the Cartesian conception of laws in Peter Harrison’s 
very engaging discussion of (1) the reaction of the Cambridge Platonists 
against Descartes’s understanding of the order of nature and the way they 
attempted to improve upon it, and (2) the response of several Newtonians to 
this improvement. Harrison notes that the central problem for both groups 
is the “hypothetical” character of the laws of nature. The Cambridge Pla-
tonists thought that deriving the laws from the immutability of God’s will, 
as Descartes did, amounts to appealing to a theoretical model to explain 
phenomena. Moreover, taking the laws to be immutable seemed to make 
them almost “brute facts,” thus threatening the role of divine providence 
in nature. To reduce these tensions, they posited “plastick natures”—spiri-
tual intermediaries that contain the laws of nature. While reinstating a role 
for divine providence, plastick natures were seen by the Newtonians as 
just another unexplained “hypothesis” or theoretical model. For their part, 
they emphasized the importance of observation and experimentation to 
discover and justify the laws of nature while at the same time holding that 
the laws are grounded in the will of God.
The early modern section concludes with two papers on Leibniz. In the 
first, Donald Rutherford argues that powers and laws are equally explana-
torily basic for Leibniz. The laws of nature are chosen by God, Leibniz 
says, but only operate in virtue of being grounded in the powers of finite 
substances. These powers are, in their turn, governed by laws decreed 
by God. Rutherford offers a persuasive interpretation according to which 
the laws governing monadic change do so according to the next best state 
for the universe to be in and so “the laws that explain the evolution of a 
monad’s perceptions could be the physical laws of nature” (171). Thus, to 
explain the laws of nature we appeal to the powers of finite substances 
which are in turn explained, at least in part, by these very laws.
In the second Leibniz chapter, Martha Brandt Bolton also considers 
the question of monadic change and argues that the laws governing such 
change are characterized by desire-like final causes. The central problem 
with this kind of position is most often expressed in terms of the problem 
of Bayle’s dog: a dog is happily chewing a bone when he suddenly re-
ceives a blow. It seems that if all substantial change is explained by desire-
like final causes, we have to conclude that the dog desires the blow, which 
seems absurd. Bolton defuses this tension by underlining the fact that the 
rational soul desires the harmony of regularity. Thus, the dog desires the 
harmony of which the blow is a part. This allows Bolton to conclude that 
nature is ordered in such a way that changes in the monad reflect the 
good in the created world because all such changes represent the desire 
for harmony.
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The final two chapters in the collection address Kant. Andrew Chignell 
offers a very interesting argument in favour of a central role for hope in 
Kant’s moral philosophy. The problem is that Kant seems simultaneously 
to hold that to be virtuous and thus happy, human beings must perform 
a revolution of will for which we are radically and ultimately responsible, 
and that such a revolution is impossible without divine assistance. Chignell 
notes that according to Kant, whether and if so how the combination of 
individual effort and divine assistance leads to happiness is something 
that is incomprehensible to us. But, importantly, Chignell suggests that 
“incomprehensible” does not mean “really impossible.” While “assistance 
in the moral life may be unknowable and even inconceivable . . . that’s not 
sufficient for being certain of its impossibility” because “inconceivability 
must not track real impossibility for Kant” (214). Chignell concludes that 
the “moral miracle” expressed by the divine concursus needed to perform 
the revolution of will is not something we can rationally expect (just as we 
cannot rationally expect miracles in the physical realm) but is something 
for which we can rationally hope.
The moral order in Kant is further explored by Eric Watkins. While the 
contributions from human beings to the moral and natural orders remain 
fundamental in Kant’s system, Watkins suggests that the divine order 
has a foundational role in three ways: God is the most real being who 
grounds the possibility of all things (first Critique), God grounds the high-
est moral good by proportioning happiness to virtue (second Critique) and 
God proportions happiness to virtue by subordinating mechanical laws to 
teleological laws (third Critique). In this way, Watkins shows that despite 
Kant’s break with the tradition of the early modern period, his system still 
shares an important feature with his predecessors: the importance of the 
divine order.
By structuring its discussions around conceptions of order, this volume 
takes its place alongside a small but growing group of works published in 
the last fifteen years that explore this narrative in the history of philoso-
phy, among which the work of historian of science Lorraine Daston is cen-
tral. This volume is a welcome addition to this group in particular for its 
treatment of the connections between divine, moral, and natural orders.
Where the volume is less successful is in the discussion of how to un-
derstand the role and scope of the “human order.” Custom and moral 
sentiment for Hume and the concepts of the understanding for Kant are 
features of human nature and thus of the human order that are centrally 
involved in natural and moral orders. But aside from these thinkers, the 
discussion of human order seems always to collapse into the moral order. 
Conspicuously absent is a recognition of the human order as political 
order. Many early modern thinkers were influenced by the natural law 
theories of Suárez, Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf. A more complete 
picture of the “human order” in early modern philosophy would need 
to involve an analysis of positive law and its justification. A discussion 
of political order would also facilitate the inclusion of thinkers outside 
Faith and Philosophy490
the canon. For instance, Margaret Cavendish’s and Mary Astell’s writings 
about social and metaphysical liberty provide important insight into the 
link between the human and moral order in early modern Europe.
But this criticism is by no means meant to indicate that the aim of the 
volume is not met. Watkins has done an excellent job of demonstrating the 
richness and promise of the narrative of order. The volume should serve as 
a call to specialists and advanced students in the field to develop and ex-
tend these themes within the systems discussed here and to other thinkers 
in the history of philosophy.
Solved by Sacrifice: Austin Farrer, Fideism, and the Evidence of Faith, by Robert 
MacSwain. Leuven: Peeters, 2013. xiii + 275 pages. $88.74 (paper).
BRIAN HEBBLETHWAITE, Queens’ College, Cambridge
This book is unquestionably a major contribution to the study of Austin 
Farrer’s writings and to philosophical reflection on the topic of faith and 
reason. It still betrays its origin in a doctoral dissertation, but its thorough-
ness in knowledge of relevant sources and background, and of fascinating 
biographical detail about Farrer, is most impressive. One cannot resist a 
wry smile, however, at the presence of so many long footnotes in a book 
about an author who forswore footnotes altogether.
Austin Farrer, regarded by many as the leading Anglican philosophical 
theologian of the twentieth century, was for many years Fellow and Chap-
lain of Trinity College, Oxford. He ended his career as Warden of Keble. 
His many books include Finite and Infinite, The Glass of Vision, The Freedom 
of the Will, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited, Saving Belief, A Science of God?, 
and Faith and Speculation. What has impressed his colleagues, pupils, hear-
ers (he was a great preacher too), and readers was the way in which he 
combined philosophical skill, theological acumen, and profound spiritu-
ality. Readers of MacSwain’s book will want to ask whether a sufficiently 
balanced picture of Farrer’s many-sidedness is maintained.
The title of the book should first be explained. “Solved by Sacrifice—sol-
vitur immolando” was Farrer’s parody of the solution to Zeno’s well-known 
paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, which “solvitur ambulando,” that is, 
is solved by carrying on walking and overtaking the tortoise, not by con-
tinuously stopping and thinking at fifty per cent segments of the distance 
behind. Similarly, Farrer urges (in a sermon, be it noted), Christian faith 
finds its justification, not in logic or argument, but in actually following 
the way of the cross and finding spiritual blessedness thereby. This is 
manifestly true of the saints and up to a point of the ordinary believer 
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